Introduction
OVERSEAS Chinese political links with China have been a subject of interest for many years. Travellers, journalists, officials and scholars have constantly made speculation, assessments and predictions about the political loyalties of overseas Chinese, and their future in their host countries. Although the overseas Chinese share a common historical and cultural background, they live in different economic environments and political climates, and in different stages of transition. Their political loyalty is especially difficult to assess. It is not just moulded by cultural, economic and political environments; it is also affected by other, less predictable factors. The rise of nationalism in the overseas Chinese communities at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries was a major factor in shaping the political life of the overseas Chinese. Using Singapore and Malaya as case studies, this paper seeks to explain how and why overseas Chinese nationalism arose during this period.
create a separate political entity outside China, nor did they take much interest in the political future of the host societies. In other words, overseas Chinese nationalism was not a component part of the indigenous nationalist movements, but an extension of modern Chinese nationalism.
The strong emotional attachment of the overseas Chinese to China stemmed partly from race and culture, and partly from social and political conditions. It is natural for emigrants to feel attached to their mother countries, and Chinese emigrants were no exception. What appears to have been exceptional was their utmost devotion to their families in China. Many of them lived a simple and hard life so as to remit the major part of their income to China to feed their family members. From a poor coolie sending a few dollars annually, to a rich merchant remitting hundreds, they all demonstrated this strong attachment.
1 This strong family loyalty constituted the basic element of overseas Chinese nationalism. Besides family ties, the overseas Chinese also retained great regard for their birthplaces in China. They expressed their feelings by contributing to economic, social and educational developments in their home districts. They raised funds for flood and famine relief, 2 donated large sums of money to establish schools and colleges, 3 and invested in railways, mining and industry. 4 Most of the overseas Chinese during the period under study shared the common feelings mentioned above, and would have liked to see a rich and powerful China which could provide them with prestige overseas. But a strong China would mean different things to them depending on where they were. To those in hostile white countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada, and to those who were ill-treated by their host governments such as the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China and Thailand, a strong China would give them not just prestige but also protection. Thus overseas Chinese nationalism was not merely an expression of the emigrants' compassion for their motherland, but could also be used as a weapon to counter the hostile policies of the host governments.
The Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, who formed a major portion of the population and lived under a more enlightened British government, had fewer grievances than other overseas Chinese. Local hostility was therefore not a major cause of the emergence of nationalist feeling, which arose chiefly from the concern for China's future and social prestige. It has been pointed out that the political loyalty of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was divided, 5 and therefore some risks of generalization are being taken here. Nevertheless, since the expression of nationalism was the most salient aspect of overseas Chinese political life and since in other respects the overseas Chinese communities seem to have been fairly apolitical during the relevant period, it seems reasonable to assume that the nationalism expressed by the articulate minority probably did reflect the state of mind of the silent majority as well.
Two types of nationalism, cultural and political, co-existed in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya in the period under study. The former was mainly intended to restore Confucian cultural values in the local communities, while the latter was chiefly motivated by the change of politics in China.
Cultural Nationalism a. The Lo Shan She Lecture Movement
Like other immigrants, the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya expressed a strong desire to preserve their cultural identity. This was indicated in their close adherence to Chinese ways of life. They ate Chinese foods, wore Chinese costumes and queues, 6 built Chinese-style houses, observed Chinese customs and traditions, 7 and exalted Chinese
4-OO YEN C H I N G -H W A N G
values. 8 Their Chinese identity was nevertheless threatened by Western and Malay cultures. The spread of Western culture in the Chinese communities came mainly through English education. As more and more Straits-born Chinese children went to English schools, English education transmitted new ideas and values. They came to accept Western values of equality, liberty and materialism. 9 Western influence also appeared in their behaviour. They tended to behave like Westerners, to abandon their own dialects, and to despise the Chinese way of life.
10 Malay influence on the other hand was the product of social environment rather than formal education. Before the end of the nineteenth century, some Chinese settlers married Malay women and produced a distinctive group known as 'Babas'. Culturally and linguistically, the Babas were closer to the Malays than to the Chinese.* 1 Although Sino-Malay intermarriage was arrested at the end of the nineteenth century by an increase of Chinese female immigrants, the Malay influence was filtered through the Straits-born Chinese girls known as 'Nyonyas'.
12 Moreover, the Malay language which was the lingua franca in the region helped to strengthen Malay cultural influence in the Chinese communities.
Viewed from a broad historical perspective, a certain degree of acculturation in the Chinese communities was the inevitable result of Malayan environment and British rule, and was necessary for the development of a harmonious plural society. But to the Chinese cultural nationalists, the trends towards Westernization and 'Babaization' were undesirable. Unlike China where members of the scholar-gentry class 14 The merchants expressed their national feeling by financing cultural activities, while the intellectuals offered leadership, organization and publicity.
One of the important steps taken by the cultural nationalists was to reassert traditional values in the Chinese communities. Fearing the loss of traditional values and probably encouraged by the Chinese consul, some cultural nationalists got together to found a society named the 'Lo Shan She' (Ht-Mitt) in Singapore in 1881. 15 Borrowing the idea of ideological control of the 'Hsiang-Yueh lecture' system in China, 16 the society conducted regular lectures on the 1 st and 15th of every month (in the lunar calendar) to expound the Sixteen Sacred Maxims of the Emperor K'ang-hsi. 17 The society collected donations from patrons, engaged full-time and part-time lecturers, and used T'ien Fu Kung (^iPS' S^) the Temple of Heavenly Blessings), the Fukien community centre, as the main venue for lectures. As lectures became more popular, four additional venues were established in Singapore. 18 The lectures 4O2 YEN CHING-HWANG attracted audiences, principal among whom were merchants and community leaders. Similar societies were organized in Malacca, Penang and Kuala Lumpur before 1895.
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Two points must be noted about the Lo Shan She. Firstly the Sixteen Maxims which formed the basic contents of the lectures contained many of the traditional values such as filial piety, loyalty to the clan, propriety and thrift, law-abiding, emphasis on agricultural work, appeasing neighbours and fellow-villagers, rejection of false doctrines and exaltation of the right learning. 20 Because the Sixteen Maxims had been compiled for the ideological control of the Chinese in China, some of the Maxims were unsuitable for overseas conditions; but values such as filial piety, loyalty to the clan, and propriety, were relevant anywhere. To the Chinese cultural nationalist in Singapore and Malaya, the Maxim of rejecting false doctrines and exalting the correct learning was of great significance, for it could be used to arrest and reverse the growing trend towards Westernization and Babaization. Although they did not pinpoint the false doctrines, they vaguely implied that the culprits were Christianity and Islam. In an article on the Sixteen Maxims published in Sing Po, a local Chinese newspaper, in 1892, a cultural nationalist with the pen-name of 'Ku-shan ta-shih' (Lonely mountain and giant rock) said of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya that 'social morality declines, and various heterodoxies undermine the orthodoxy' (Jen-hsin fang-shih, ch'-un-hsieh h'ai cheng) (A-D Sfc^Qffl^IE).
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The orthodoxy-heterodoxy antithesis had long been used in Chinese history to define the relationship between Confucianism and non-Confucian doctrines. 22 In the context of Singapore and Malaya, the charge of heterodoxy seems rather to have been directed against Chritianity and Islam. If the Christian and Muslim influence in the Chinese communities were to be contained, the best way was not to launch any direct attack on them, but to re-assert the traditional values of Confucianism.
Secondly, an examination of a list of patrons of the society published in 1897 reveals that the majority of the supporters of the Lo Shan She lecture movement were rich merchants of Chinese-educated back- 19 Ibid., p. 5
ground. Among the principal patrons were Wu Chin-ch'ing {&mm), Chang Jen-hsien (# £•;.£), Yeh Ch'ung-yun. (3gfl£'ii), Goh Siew-tin {%M&) and Tan Tai (MM)- 23 It is noticeable that the most of these were also holders of Ch'ing official titles. 24 The acquisition of Ch'ing honours by purchase was a clear indication of their interest in the traditional values. 25 Besides making donations to the Lo Shan She some of these wealthy merchants set up additional lecture halls in their shops. 26 They participated enthusiastically in most of the lectures so as to set the example for other people to follow. 27 Another small group of supporters of the Lo Shan She consisted of Chinese-educated intellectuals. Most of them had received traditional Chinese education in China, and it may have been after failing to pass higher imperial examinations to qualify themselves for official positions that they came to overseas Chinese communities and found employment in educational and cultural institutions. 28 It was natural for them to be active in the cultural nationalist movement, for it was their vested interest to spread Chinese culture, to expound Confucian values to promote Chinese literary learning. 25/1/1897, P-5-4 Wu Chin-ch'ing had purchased five Ch'ing official titles between 1889 a n d 1896 ranging from Tzu-cheng to Yen-yun-shih with feather; Chang Jen-hsien purchased two titles of Lang-chung and Erh-p'in between 1889 and 1896. Goh Siew-tin possessed Chih-fu and Tao-t'ai titles, and T a n T a i possessed Chung-hsien ta-fu and T'ung-feng ta-fu titles. See Yen Ching-hwang, trans, by Chang Ch'ing-chiang, 'Ch'ing-ch'ao tsu-kuan chih-tu yu Hsin-Ma hua-tsu ling-tao-ch'en 2 8 For instance, the three teachers employed by the Ts'ui Ying Chinese School in Singapore were Wang Pan-kuei, Hsu H'o-ming (j'rfSift) and Wang Yun-kuei ( \:'li\b)-All of them were intellectuals from China. From 1895 to 1897, the three teachers of the same school were Wang Pan-kuei, H u a n g Shih-tso (KVtfF) and Hsia Chi-ming ( g g £ a J )• Both H u a n g and Hsia were also intellectuals from China. See Sing Po, 24/2/1891, p. 8; 16/2/1895, P-8; 22/12/1897, p. 5. society in Singapore founded by the Ch'ing consul, Tso Ping-lung.
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Another full-time lecturer, Wang Hui-yi (I'#f8), was one of the founders of the Confucian Revival movement in Singapore and Malaya. 30 The Lo Shan She lecture movement was strongly backed by the Ch'ing consul in Singapore who endorsed the lectures by conducting their opening ceremonies. 31 The endorsement was important for the movement since many Chinese, particularly the wealthy merchants, would hesitate to give support to any movement which was not officially approved.
Compared with the scholar-gentry in China, the cultural nationalists in Singapore and Malaya were less steeped in, and devoted to, Chinese culture. The intellectuals who found jobs overseas appeared to be of inferior quality, 32 while the merchants could not spare sufficient time for cultural activities. They desired to uphold Chinese culture, and were aware of the threats of Westernization and 'Babaization', but they lacked perseverance and a well thought-out plan. Moreover, they were far from a cohesive group. Because of the Pang System and the divisions and prejudices it caused, 33 the movement failed to cut across dialect lines: few Cantonese or Teochew would be willing to attend lectures sponsored by the Fukien community. 34 Cantonese and Teochew organized their own lecturing societies known as 'T'ung Shan She' 3 1 T h e normal procedure of conducting a lecture was to set up an incense altar at the lecture hall. T h e Chinese consult-general in his official robes would lead executive members of the Lo Shan She to perform kowtow ceremony towards the North. This act was a symbol of kowtowing to the emperor of China. After the ceremony the lecturer would begin his lecture. Sometimes, the consul-general might give a concluding speech towards the end of the proceedings. See'Sheng-yushou-chiang',in,Sm,g.Po, 16/3/1893, p. 5; 'Hsuan chiang sheng-yu chi-ch'en', in Sing Po, 15/2/1895, p. 5; 'Shan-t'ang chi-tien', in Sing Po, 18/2/1895, p . 5.
3 2 This opinion was held overseas as well as in China. In 1909, for instance, when the Ch'ing Ministry of Education intended to promote Chinese education among its overseas subjects, it had to induce qualified teachers to serve overseas by special rewards. (|5]#iiii), Society for Doing Common Good), 35 set up separate halls, and conducted lectures in their own dialects. 36 There was a lack of co-operation and co-ordination among these different dialect societies, and the disunity greatly weakened the movement. It had some influence in merchant circles, but failed to develop into a large-scale cultural movement for the Chinese as a whole.
b. The Confucian Revival Movement
Perhaps the most important expression of Chinese cultural nationalism in Singapore and Malaya was the Confucian revival movement which emerged in 1889. Although the movement contained a mixture of cultural, religious, political and social elements, the cultural was perhaps the most important as cultural nationalists strove to revive Confucian values in the overseas Chinese communities. Spurred by the Confucian revival movement in China, the cultural nationalists opened their campaign in Kuala Lumpur. They convened a meeting in September and resolved to observe Confucius's birthday (27th day of 8th moon of the lunar calendar) as a public holiday for all Chinese. Shops should be closed for business, there should be a celebration at home, and people should pay homage to a portrait of Confucius temporarily installed at the T'ung Shan Hospital. 37 The meeting also resolved that representatives should be elected from various dialect groups in the local community to perform sacrificial ceremonies to Confucius. All Chinese were called upon to adopt the Confucian calendar along with Emperor Kuang-hsu's reigning year. 38 The movement quickly spread to Singapore and Malacca. About two weeks after the convention in Kuala Lumpur, the Fukien community leaders in Singapore decided to follow suit by observing Confucius's birthday. 3°/9/' 8 99> P-'• 3 9 It was the committee members of the Chinese Free School (Chui E n g S i E, orTs'ui Ying Shu Yuan, i£ $£ VTF Ki £ )> t n a t decided to follow the example of the Kuala Lumpur Chinese. Since most leaders of the school were also leaders of the Fukien community, the decision was in fact for the Fukien community. See ThienNan Shin Pao, 13/10/1899, p. 7.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00015249 same year. 40 At this early stage of the movement, it is significant that it concentrated chiefly on the symbols of Confucius's portrait and the Confucian calendar. In the Chinese cultural context, the worship of Confucius's portrait was expected to produce lasting psychological effects on individuals, and to revive and strengthen the Chinese culture which had been weakened by an alien environment. Worship of his portrait would help to re-establish Confucius's authority. Enthusiasm kindled in that way would then be heightened by the celebration of Confucius's birthday and the use of the Confucian calendar. This strategy was substantially different from that of the Lo Shan She lecture movement. The lecture movement attempted to restore some Confucian values by expounding their substance. The Confucian revival movement attempted to revive some Confucian values not so much by explaining the essence of those values, but by establishing the authority of Confucius in the minds of the overseas Chinese. By doing so, the cultural nationalists effectively laid the foundation for a mass movement.
If the cultural nationalists believed that worshipping was a more effective measure than reasoning for reviving Confucian values, it was logical for them to champion the establishment of Confucian temples. Once Confucianism was made a religion, it would exert religious power over its converts. The movement was supported by three Chinese newspapers in Singapore, namely, the Sing Po (fll W), the Thien Nan Shin Pao (•%. iti fii %$) and Jit Shin Pau (H #f.$g). T h e papers gave wide coverage to the activities and published editorials and articles to create a favourable intellectual atmosphere for the movement to develop. 41 At the same time the movement was aided by some visiting Confucian scholar-officials. Although they came to Singapore and Malaya in an official capacity to promote commerce, 42 they also delivered public lectures and contributed articles to boost the movement. As the movement gathered sufficient momentum, it made a major thrust into the local Chinese communities in 1902. A body which was to spearhead the movement was created early in that year following two important meetings in Singapore. A committee of 195 members was set up; a public notice appealing to all Chinese was published; and regulations for establishing Confucian temples and modern schools were issued. 43 The main task of the committee was to raise funds for the construction of the temples and schools. Apart from on-the-spot donations, the committee organized its members to press for house-to-house donations. 44 But the most effective method was the giving of prestige to big donors. Regulations provided that ancestral tablets of the more generous donors would be placed in the shrine built in or beside the Confucian temple. 45 As a result of this intensive campaign, more than 200,000 Straits dollars were raised by mid-1902. 46 But the movement then abruptly receded because of its inherent weaknesses and the impact of a sudden change of attitude in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. As the movement was primarily a cultural one, it lacked religious zeal and a tight-knit organization to implement its programmes. It also lacked dedicated leaders except Dr Lim Boon Keng. 47 The immediate impact on the movement was the change of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's attitude towards Confucianism. Demoralized by the defeat of the Reformer's armed uprising in igoo, 48 Liang was politically unstable in the period between 1901 and 1903, 49 and his attitude towards Confucianism was also affected. He began to question the wisdom of making Confucianism the state religion of China, and of worshipping Confucius. This abrupt change of attitude was demonstrated in his article entitled 'Pao-chiao fei tsun-kung lun' (To Protect the Religion is not to Worship Confucius) which was published in the Hsin-min ts'ung-pao, the Reformers' organ in Japan in February 1902, and it was reproduced in the Thien Nan Shin Pao in Singapore. 50 In this article, he reversed his former position and argued that there was no need to make Confucianism the state religion which would curtail the freedom of thought of Chinese people. 51 Liang was also obsessed by the frivolous and symbolic inclinations of the movement such as building Confucian temples and worshipping Confucius's portraits. As Liang wielded tremendous influence among the overseas Chinese through his writings, his drastic change of attitude must have shattered the faith of many of his followers, and held them back from supporting the movement in Singapore and Malaya. 52 It was not until 1908 that it revived again in the form of observing Confucius's birthday. On the 27th of the 8th moon of each year many Chinese paid homage to the sage by making that day a holiday. 53 Shops closed for business, schools closed and sacrifices were made at home in front of Confucius's portrait. 54 The movement built up momentum again, but this time the centre of gravity shifted from Singapore to Penang; control of the leadership had passed to a group of pro-Ch'ing wealthy merchants led by the ex-dignitary Chang Pi-shih (?S?B §±, also known as Chang Chen-hsun, best known in the West as Thio Tiauw Siat) whose base of operations was in Penang. The resurgence reached its climax in 1911 with large-scale fund-raising activity in Penang. Rich merchants of various dialect groups were organized, and so were many ordinary people. 55 A Confucian temple, the first of its kind in Singapore and Malaya, was built in Penang at the end of 1911.
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Compared with the Lo Shan She Lecture movement, the Confucian Revival movement had three notable achievements. First, it was a better organized and co-ordinated attempt to restore the traditional and reformed values of Confucianism. It had a centralized body to plan and co-ordinate its work. Although the movement did not convert all Chinese in Singapore and Malaya into Confucianists, it had visible achievements in the observance of Confucius's birthday, the opening of 51 See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Tin-ping-shieh wen-chi (Literary Works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) (Hong Kong, 1955) modern schools, and the construction of Confucian temples. Second, it was a concerted effort by all Chinese cultural nationalists, both traditional and modern, to establish an institution through which Confucian values could be reasserted. It was the first movement in the region that cut across dialect lines, and thus contributed to the solidarity of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. Third, it was a more broadly-based cultural movement. The news media were used to mobilize public support, and together with house-to-house soliciting provided the movement with effective means to reach the masses. It should also be noticed that the Confucian Revival movement was more politically oriented than the Lo Shan She Lecture movement. The early part of the movement was evidently influenced by K'ang Yu-wei's reformist ideology. It was used by Dr Lim Boon Keng and Khoo Seok-wan, two reformist leaders in Singapore, to advance their political beliefs. However the later part of the movement, particularly in Penang, was used by the pro-Ch'ing conservatives to counter the influence of the revolutionary ideology spread by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his followers. Thus cultural nationalism in general, and the Confucian revival in particular, were used at different times by diverse groups to advance their political aims.
Political Nationalism
Chinese political nationalism in Singapore and Malaya was expressed in a more sophisticated way than cultural nationalism. Some of the political nationalist movements possessed modern platforms, created effective organizations for mass mobilization, and developed techniques for indoctrination. The degree of sophistication would match any other modern political movement in the world. In a broad historical perspective, the rise of political nationalism in Singapore and Malaya during this period was a response to events in China rather than to local pressures. But the response to the situation in China was a divided one. The political nationalists were at loggerheads with one another, with their loyalties divided between the Ch'ing government, the reformists and the revolutionaries.
a. Pro-Ch'ing Nationalism
The movement to cultivate pro-Ch'ing nationalism among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya began with the founding of the Ch'ing terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00015249 consulate in Singapore in 1877. The Ch'ing consul was skilful at mobilizing broad support by enlisting the help of community leaders. On occasions such as birthdays of the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager, he would gather them together to pay homage. Solemn ceremonies were held at the consulate, during which rites of prostration were performed. 57 At the same time, the consul issued notices urging the people to honour the monarchy.
58 On extra-ordinary occasions such as the Emperor Kuang-hsu's marriage and his accession to the throne, Chinese were mobilized to express their allegiance by making the occasion a public holiday; shops and schools were closed, houses were decorated with flowers and lanterns, dragon flags were hoisted, and special drama performances were held in the streets for public entertainment.
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As the Ch'ing consul had no legal power over the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, he could only appear, or use his influence to persuade people to conform, but he could not punish anyone who disregarded his notices. His influence was further curtailed by the British colonial authorities who jealously guarded their power over the Chinese subjects in the colonies. 60 In such circumstances, an effective way of mobilizing and keeping alive the overseas Chinese loyalty was to foster Chinese identity. The key to the fostering of Chinese identity was to arouse enthusiasm for Chinese culture. Things Chinese were to be promoted, encouraged and valued. The consul began to promote literary interest in the Chinese classics and poetry. In 1882 the consul Tso Ping-lung helped to organize and launch a literary society in Singapore named Hui Hsien She (The Society for the Meeting of Literary Excellence), the first of its kind in the Chinese-speaking communities in Singapore and Malaya. He acted as the patron and the judge, and set topics for essay and poem competitions at the beginning of every month. The effort of the Ch'ing consul in arousing Chinese national consciousness was greatly assisted by the fund rasing movement for the relief of national calamities in China. The provincial governments of Kwangtung and Fukien sent out several missions to visit Southeast Asia. After arriving in Singapore and Malaya the missions made contact with the local Chinese leaders and publicized their intentions in the local Chinese newspapers. Agents were appointed among the local leaders to solicit contributions. 66 Using imperial honours as inducements, most of these missions succeeded in raising substantial funds for their relief works in China. 67 Apart from its economic aspect the movement was an effective means of bringing the overseas Chinese closer to China. The publicity about the natural calamities in China aroused overseas Chinese concern and sympathy for their motherland. The missions established links between the Ch'ing bureaucracy and the upper class of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. From the distributions of imperial honours, members of that class derived prestige, psychological satisfaction and continuing desire to be close to the Ch'ing government.
Pro-Ch'ing nationalism was stimulated by the visits of Ch'ing diplomats, dignitaries, officials and special envoys. The diplomats and dignitaries usually stopped over in Singapore on their way to Europe. 68 Although their stay was short, and their contacts with the local communities were limited, they sometimes managed to convey the imperial message of concern. 69 Officials who were sent to Southeast Asia on fund-raising, fact finding, trade and educational missions, spent a longer time in the local communities than the diplomats and dignitaries. Though they were generally not politically motivated, the nature of their business often obliged them to evoke nationalist feelings in order to get more contributions or trade. 70 There were six major visits by imperial envoys to Singapore and Malaya from 1890 to 1911. 71 These visitors did have political purposes. They were intending to spread China's prestige overseas, to cultivate loyalty among the overseas subjects, and to defuse the anti-Ch'ing activities of the reformists and revolutionaries in the overseas Chinese communities.
72 Pro-Ch'ing nationalists sentiment was both excited and rewarded by the splendour of the visitations with their glamorous escort of Chinese warships. In 1894, for instance, the Singapore visit of Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang with four warships created a sensational response. Large numbers of the local Chinese (old and young, men and women alike) crowded the harbour, all exalted by the sight of the warships and the dragon flags, and the noise of salutes. 73 The visits of the imperial envoys also attracted many expressions of loyalty by members of the Chinese merchant class who were often community leaders. As many of them had purchased Ch'ing brevet titles, 74 they dressed themselves in official costumes, and gathered at the harbour to greet the distinguished visitors. These were followed by banquets hosted by the Ch'ing consul or prominent merchants with many pledges of loyalty to the emperor and to China. 75 It even happened that some leaders of the Straits Chinese whose usual political loyalty was to the British empire, nevertheless pledged their loyalty to the Ch'ing government on some of these occasions. 76 This reflected the identity problem of some of the Straits Chinese.
The spontaneous expression of pro-Ch'ing nationalism was impressive, but it could not be lasting for it could not be effectively mobilized to serve the Manchu interests without a mechanism. Partly to provide such a mechanism, the Ch'ing government encouraged the establishment of chambers of commerce throughout overseas Chinese communities. The Chinese chamber of commerce of course had its origin in China, beginning in Shanghai in 1902 as an organization to attract business support. When it proved to be successful at home, it was introduced to the overseas Chinese communities. The man who was instrumental in establishing Chinese chambers of commerce in Southeast Asia was Chang Pi-shih, a wealthy Chinese leader in the region. Chang had an audience with the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi in 1903 and impressed her with his ideas for modernizing China. 77 He was appointed the Imperial Commissioner to inspect Commercial Affairs Overseas (K'aoch'a shang-wu ta-ch'en), with a duty to tour the region to gain the support of the overseas Chinese. 78 Chang had wide contacts in the region, including his commercial empire in Penang, Sumatra, Java, and his experience as vice-consul in Penang and acting consul-general in Singapore 79 facilitated his operations. When he arrived in Singapore in December 1905, he quickly mobilized the support of the leaders of various dialect groups, and convened a meeting on 18 December at the Tong Chai Hospital. There he proposed the founding of a Chinese chamber of commerce, and donated S$3,ooo for the new organization. As a result, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of commerce, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, was inaugurated on 16 March 1906. 80 With Chang's direct influence, the Chinese chamber of commerce of Penang was founded in 1907. 81 This was followed by the founding of the Selangor and Perak Chinese chambers of commerce respectively in 1909. 82 In retrospect, the Chinese chambers of commerce in Singapore and Malaya during this period helped to unite the local Chinese communities, and served the interests of the Ch'ing government well. All chambers were given official recognition by registering with the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in Peking, and each of them was granted an official seal by the court. 83 The chambers thus enjoyed semi-official status in relation to China. They communicated directly with the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, without going through the local Chinese consulates, and isssued protective passes to their members who escorted coffins back to China. 84 They helped the Ch'ing government to raise funds and to float capital for investment in China. 85 At the same time, they fostered pro-Ch'ing nationalism, and channelled it towards the Manchu government.
The use of the Chinese chamber of commerce as the Ch'ing government's agent in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya does not seem to have threatened the office of Chinese consul. It did not replace the consulate, nor did it usurp the consul's major functions. As the power of the Chinese consul-general in Singapore was curbed by the local British colonial officials, 87 the chamber was in fact freer and more effective than the consul-general in carrying out the wishes of the Ch'ing government. In this sense, the chamber supplemented rather than undermined the work of the Ch'ing diplomat.
Who were the pro-Ch'ing nationalists in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya? What socio-economic and educational background did they come from? A pro-Ch'ing political nationalist was likely to be a person who was wealthy, China-born and Chinese educated. He was also likely to have purchased Ch'ing official titles and contacts with Ch'ing diplomats and visiting officials. Certainly many of the leaders of the Chinese chambers of commerce of the region were pro-Ch'ing nationalist leaders. In Singapore the first president of the chamber, Goh Siew-tin, was a well-known pro-Ch'ing leader. Goh was a wealthy merchant, born in China and had a Chinese education. He possessed two Ch'ing brevet titles, Chih-fu (ft Iff fg ) and Tao-t'ai (jfi 1% jg ), 8 8 and had been at one stage the acting Ch'ing consul-general in Singapore. 92 They actively promoted proCh'ing nationalism on occasions such as the Emperor's and EmpressDowager's birthdays, and the Emperor Kuang-hsu's marriage. 93 They welcomed the visits of the Ch'ing dignitaries, 94 and mobilized financial support at times when China faced national calamities, or war with foreign powers. 95 
b. Reformist Nationalism
Part of the overseas Chinese nationalism in Singapore and Malaya was expressed through the reformist movement. The movement was clearly an extension of the world-wide reformist movement led by K'ang Yu-wei. After the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi's palace coup against the Emperor Kuang-hsu, and the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898, K'ang Yu-wei, the main figure behind the reform, had to flee to Hong Kong and Japan for his life. 96 He then went to North America and Southeast Asia to mobilize support among the overseas Chinese. K'ang's launching of the Emperor Protection Society (Pao Huang Hui $k Aim ) m July '899 demonstrated his intention of saving the Emperor from the control of the Empress-Dowager, and of restoring the sovereign power of the Emperor. 97 To K'ang and other reformist leaders, the overseas Chinese were their most important assets. They had little hope of restoring the Emperor's power by force. But they could use the overseas Chinese to bring pressure to bear on the Ch'ing government, from bases beyond that government's control K'ang and his main disciples seem to have believed that persuasions of that kind could restore the Emperor's rule. In planning a world-wide campaign to press the Empress-Dowager to give up her power, the reformist leaders considered Singapore and Malaya as the key to the successful mobilization of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. But before the arrival of K'ang Yu-wei in Singapore in February 1900, 98 a movement had already developed in support of K'ang's cause. The moving spirits of the movement were Khoo Seok-wan (SPIxB) and Dr Lim Boon Keng ( # • £ ! £ ) . Both were appalled by the decline of China's power and the rising threat of foreign imperialism, and shared the view that China could not be saved from imminent peril without a thorough political reform." Stimulated by the increasing pressure of the Western imperialist powers on China, and influenced by the activities of the reformists at home, both Khoo and Lim saw the need to mobilize local Chinese for the reformist cause. In May 1898, they founded in Singapore the Thien Nan Shin Pao ( ?>cift$?$?)> a modern Chinese newspaper.
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The newspaper used the Confucian calendar which was symbolic of reviving the reinterpreted Confucianism in the service of China's reform. 101 Khoo became the publisher and the Chinese editor, Dr Lim Boon Keng was made the English editor of the newspaper. 102 The newspaper was echoing the demand of the reformists in China. It advocated the introduction of a parliamentary system, attacked the corruption and inefficiency of the Ch'ing bureaucracy, and widely publicized the programmes of the Hundred Days' Reform (11 June to 21 September 1898). 103 The dramatic failure of the Hundred Days' Reform seems not to have disheartened the reformists in Singapore and Malaya. Instead, they mobilized public opinion to give continuing support to K'ang Yu-wei's cause.
Throughout 1899, the reformists in Singapore and Malaya under the leadership of Khoo Seok-wan and Dr Lim Boon Keng, campaigned actively for the return of the Emperor Kuang-hsu's rule. On 28 September 1899, t n e Thien Nan Shin Pao, the mouth piece of the reformists, published an editorial urging the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi to return sovereign power to the Emperor, 104 emphasizing that it was the wish of the people to see the wise and beloved Emperor return to Strangely, the petition did not mention anything about restoring sovereign power, but expressed deep concern for the health of the Emperor Kuang-hsu. 107 This was in fact a subtle way of expressing discontent with the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi's handling of the whole affair, and was meant to deter her from deposing the Emperor, which she and her conservative supporters were already planning to do. In January 1899, she issued a decree claiming the Emperor was ill and cancelling all his official engagements; at the end of January, she interviewed some child princes who were likely to be chosen as heir to the Emperor T'ung-chih, the preceding emperor who had died in 1874 without an heir. 108 In September of the same year she issued a further decree claiming that the Emperor's illness was not improving.
109 All these were interpreted by the reformists in Singapore and Malaya as clear signs of a conspiracy to depose the Emperor. They thought that the best way to halt the conspiracy was not to attack the Empress-Dowager openly, but to express love and concern for the health of the Emperor. The unmentioned message of the petition ought to be clear to the Empress-Dowager: the Emperor was much loved by his overseas subjects, and any move to depose him would not be tolerated.
Following the October petition, the reformists in Singapore and Malaya demonstrated their strength again by mobilizing a thousand or more supporters, and sending a telegram to the Empress-Dowager on her birthday. 110 This time the message was expressed more directly, though still delicately. She was urged to return the power to the Emperor for her own beloved sake, because of her age, so that she should be enabled to retire from burdensome administration and enjoy a peaceful life. 1 0 9 See Thien Nan Shin Pao, 7/10/1899, p. 5. 1 1 0 It was claimed that there were a few hundred signatures collected in Singapore, and seven hundred collected in Kuala Lumpur. The telegrams were sent separately to the Tsungli Yamen in Peking; the Singapore telegram was under the leadership of Lin Yun-lung (^' i ' l i l ) , a native of Nan-an district of Fukien, who was also a rich merchant; the Kuala L u m p u r telegram was sent under the names of Fan C h ' a n g (fa /',) and W a n g T s e -m i n (\\\% hi Malaya were involved in this revolt is uncertain. But Khoo Seok-wan (pronounced in Mandarin as Ch'iu Shu-yuan), the top leader of the reformist movement in Singapore and Malaya, had certainly donated a large sum of money to finance the revolt. One source claims that the donation was in the vicinity of S$25O,ooo. 118 Given the influence that K'ang Yu-wei had among the local Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, it is reasonable to suggest that he must also have obtained donations other than Khoo's. Whatever amount the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya had donated, the abortive revolt dealt a heavy blow to the reformists in general, and the reformist movement in Singapore in particular. Khoo Seok-wan was disheartened, and his relationship with K'ang Yu-wei became cold. The strained relationship was finally broken up in 1901 after a quarrel over the handling of a contribution of S$5O,ooo made by the Chinese in Australia towards the revolt. 119 Khoo announced in the Thien Nan Shin Pao that he had disassociated himself from the reformists, and gave his support to the Ch'ing government. 120 In retrospect, Khoo Seok-wan's desertion from the reformist camp appears to have demoralized some of his followers, 121 and weakened the reformist movement in Singapore and Malaya. Although the movement recovered after 1905, and became the keen competitor to the Chinese revolutionaries led by Dr Sun Yat-sen, it had lost much of the dynamism generated between 1899 and 1900, and had reduced the chance of acquiring solid support from the overseas Chinese in the region.
In the course of mobilizing support, the reformists employed modern techniques. The use of media and front organizations was the best example. Modern media consisting mainly of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets had been used by the reformists to spread their political ideology, and to mobilize public opinion. The publishing of the Thien Man Shin Pao in 1898 and the Jit Shin Pau in 1899 122 provided the reformists with effective means of reaching the general public. Both Thien Man and Jit Shin were used to propagate Chinese nationalism and the reform idea, and to attack the Empress-Dowager's government. They were also used to publicize the activities of the reformists, to transmit political messages from the national reformist leaders, and to solicit financial and other forms of support from the readers. 123 The reformists in Singapore and Malaya also adopted modern forms of organization. When the first Emperor Protection Society (Pao Huang Hui) was founded by K'ang Yu-wei in Victoria, Canada, in July 1899, branches quickly spread to other parts of Canada, United States, Mexico, South America, Hawaii and Japan. It is claimed by Wu Hsien-tzu, an important disciple of K'ang Yu-wei at that time, that a branch was set up in Penang probably in 1899, and the Singapore branch with Khoo Seok-wan as its president was established in 1900. 124 For unknown reasons, the branches in Singapore and Malaya and in other parts of Southeast Asia were made underground. This was in contrast to the branches in North and South America, Mexico, Hawaii and Japan where lists of the members' names were widely publicized.
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Being clandestine, the societies in Singapore and Malaya badly needed front organizations to carry out activities. The organization that emerged to meet this need was Hao Hsueh Hui ( £ ? ¥ # , known as the Chinese Philomatic Society) which was founded by Dr Lim Boon Keng on 6 September 1899 in Singapore. 126 In the announcement in the press, the society emphasized that it was a registered body, and was to organize public talks once a month at the Thien Nan Shin Pao office and the shop Heng Ch'un. 127 The emphasis on the legality of the society indicated the reformist concern for its image in the community. It was intended to spread its message widely. The professed aim of the society was to gather literary enthusiasts (Wen-hsueh chih-shih i^p/f.dt ) together to discuss politics (China and foreign, current and ancient) and new theories in science, 128 but in fact the society was to push the theory of reform, and to discuss China's current politics as they interpreted it. This was clearly reflected in the topics of the public lectures and the speakers who were invited. In the first ten lectures in the three months from September to December 1899, most topics were related to the theory of reform, Hundred Days' Reform, Confucianism, establishment of Confucian temples and modern schools, and reform of education.
129
The three main speakers were Khoo Seok-wan, Dr Lim Boon Keng and Yeh Chi-yuen, who were the leaders of the reformists in Singapore.
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The society had aggressive methods of recruitment. People who signed their names to attend lectures were automatically considered to be 'members' (Hui-yu# X), and their names were published in the reformist newspapers Thien Nan Shin Pao and Jit Shin Pau. 'Members' did not appear to be required to pay subscription fees, nor were they bound by any rules and regulations. Subscriptions and rules did not concern the reformist leaders, who chiefly wanted to use the society to create an intellectual atmosphere which would help to advance their political aims. Partly due to its legal status in the community, and partly due to its loose and easy way of recruiting, the society claimed to have over 200 'members'. 131 From the membership's lists, it appears that the Hao Hsueh Hui had attracted mostly merchants and journalists, and some doctors and government servants. The majority of them were probably Chinese-educated. 132 Because they were Chinese-educated and had some leisure, such people were naturally concerned about political development in China, and susceptible to the reformists' propaganda. It Li Yung-hsiang ( $ f g £ s ) were Chinese journalists working with both the Thien Man Shin Pao and Jit Shin Pau; men like Hu Po-hsiang ( $ f f t l l ) , c h ' e n Yung-kuang (|Sj|;3g*), Liang Min-hsiu (mtfcB), Ch'iu Yen-pin ( Bfllffi'tf), Wu Ying-p'ei ( g f f i t i ), Teo Eng-hock (^ ,jc«), Huang Chao-k'un ( i S & S ) , H u a n g Chao-chen (M&&), H u a n g Chao-yuan ( K & i g i ) . Lin Wei-fang (fr<fc$£5j ), were known merchants. See lists of 'members' of the H a o Hsueh Hui published in the Thien Man Shin Pao, 9/10/1899, p. 5; 12/10/1899, p. 8; 18/10/1899, p. 5; 30/10/1899, p. 5; 4/11/1899, p. 8; 11/11/1899, P-5; ' 3 / I 2 / l 8 9 9 > P-5-seems reasonable to suggest that many of them may also have been members of the underground Emperor Protection Society. 133 But the nature of the nationalism merits some discussion. Firstly the nationalism preached by the revolutionaries was wider in scope than the pro-Ch'ing and reformist nationalism. The pro-Ch'ing nationalists only promoted loyalty towards the Ch'ing dynasty. The reformists wanted to restore the Emperor Kuang-hsu. They also wanted to save China from foreign imperialism by institutional reforms, but still in a somewhat traditional way, under the Emperor Kuang-hsu. The revolutionaries were more radical in a number of ways. Their nationalism was directed not to an emperor or the reigning dynasty, but to the nation-state of China. They did their best to make clear the difference between loyalty to emperor and loyalty to the nation-state. 134 In line with the pervasive nationalism in the world at that time, Dr Sun Yat-sen was deliberately nationalistic, and thought that part of his revolutionary message was important for the survival of China.
135 Secondly, the revolutionaries had given Chinese nationalism new dimensions. The main component of revolutionary nationalism was anti-Manchuism. Of course, anti-Manchu nationalism was not new in Chinese history; it had arisen in the seventeenth century in the resistance against the Manchu conquest. 136 But it was systemati-cally developed and perfected by the revolutionaries. More importantly, the new revolutionary nationalism also contained constructive elements: it proposed to build China as a modern and powerful nation-state, able to take its place and defend itself in the modern world. 137 This put the anti-Manchuism in proper context-to overthrow the Manchus was not an act of revenge, but a means to save China from foreign imperialism. Thirdly, the revolutionary nationalism had the greatest impact on the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. Compared with the pro-Ch'ing nationalists and the reformists, the revolutionaries were more successful in mobilizing support. They possessed a reasonably well-organized party, the T'ung Meng Hui, a clearly defined platform, and a well-developed propaganda network. The use of newspapers, books and magazines to spread the revolutionary message was obviously not different from the reformists, but the use of reading clubs (Shu Pao She), night schools, public rallies and drama troupes as propaganda vehicles was new.
138 By these means the revolutionaries broadened their social base, and effectively mobilized support among the illiterate masses of the overseas Chinese. Thus revolutionary nationalism had a greater impact than pro-Ch'ing nationalism and reformist nationalism in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya.
Conclusion
Some conclusions may be drawn from the above study. Two types of nationalist movements, cultural and political, existed side by side in the overseas Chinese Communities in Singapore and Malaya during the period under study. Most of these nationalist movements were Chinaoriented. There was little or no intention to develop a separate overseas Chinese identity, nor was there any interest in local indigenous movements in the region. In this context, we conclude that overseas Chinese nationalism was an offshoot of modern Chinese nationalism, and not a component part of indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia.
Like nationalism in other countries, the nationalism of the overseas Chinese in this period derived mainly from their race and culture, the special attachment to their birthplace, and the desire to retain racial and cultural identity. Its growth was stimulated by the efforts of the Ch'ing consuls, the visiting Ch'ing diplomats, officials and special envoys. It was greatly influenced by the rise of the reform and revolutionary movements in China, and by the activities of the reformists and revolutionaries who arrived in the region. At the same time, the growth of nationalism was heightened by the rise of world imperialism and its threat to the survival of China as a nation and of the Chinese as a race, and the overseas Chinese increasingly linked their fate with the destiny of their motherland.
